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FOCUS-Crise entre la Russie et l'Ukraine : escalade et désescalade, ces mots sont des leurres

Portrait de Pr. Philippe WECKEL
Soumis par Pr. Philippe WECKEL le jeu, 01/08/2015 - 10:31
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Bulletin numéro 397 du 22/06/2014​. La désescalade a fait flores dans le discours diplomatique - Le critère de la désescalade face à la maskirovska russe- Le critère de la violation du droit international est suffisant pour fonder les réactions collectives et dispense de la recherche des intentions réelles - Documents - Evolution de la situation générale - Le plan du Président ukrainien - Le swing français - Nouveau rapport sur les droits de l'homme en Ukraine - Le projet russe de résolution au Conseil de sécurité - Nouvelles sanctions ciblées adoptées par les Etats-Unis

 

Dans la gestion internationale de la crise entre la Russie et l’Ukraine la « désescalade » fait florès. Cette vieille expression française n’est pas en rapport avec l’île indonésienne de Flores, ses Hobbit (Homo floresiensis) et ses dragons (Varanus komodoensis). Elle évoque une explosion florale comme l’abondante floraison des cerisiers dans les premiers jours d’avril au Japon (Sakura). Elle désigne donc un immense succès. Mais le temps du traditionnel hanami au parc d'Ueno à Tokyo est éphémère.

La « désescalade » a envahi le discours diplomatique ; or la formule s’use, alors que la crise en s’étirant dans le temps se développe.

Le mot a marqué une première période de la crise qui s’est achevée le 25 mai dernier avec l’élection du nouveau président de l’Ukraine. La désescalade a constitué la priorité absolue de la diplomatie hantée par le spectre d’un engrenage militaire entre la Russie et les Occidentaux. L’année du centenaire de la Première guerre mondiale, l’escalade est dans tous les esprits. Il n’y a pas lieu d’insister sur l’importance de cette gestion prudente qui a le soutien de tous les peuples. On est tout de même frappé par l’envahissement de l’espace diplomatique par la « désescalade ». Le mot est hégémonique au point d’absorber toute la politique française dans la crise. « Désescalade, désescalade, désescalade », tels ont été et sont encore les trois éléments fondamentaux de la position française. 

Le mot "escalade" est emprunté au langage militaire et il désigne un processus réciproque d'aggravation des menaces militaires. Il se présente comme une chaîne de réactions devant conduire à une confrontation armée. Les Ukrainiens ne vivent pas la situation comme les diplomates voudraient la décrire. Ils ont subi le rouleau compresseur russe en Crimée et ont le sentiment de vivre un engrenage unilatéral, pas une escalade, similaire dans le Donbass. Et parce que le plan de paix du Président de l'Ukraine contrarie les plans de la Russie la période actuelle est particulièrement critique. 

Logiquement la désescalade devrait désigner le processus contraire, c'est-à-dire une suite vertueuse de comportements et de décisions de nature à réduire les tensions et le risque de la confrontation. Or la maskirovka (le camouflage, la ruse, la dissimulation, etc.) constitue un élément essentiel de la doctrine militaire russe, mais elle a acquis une portée bien plus large. Les "hommes verts" en Crimée, les accusations mensongères, telles celles qui ont visé la porte-parole du Département d'Etat américain ou qui ont porté sur l'utilisation par les Ukrainien de projectiles au phospore contre des zones habitées, voire les affirmations délirantes sur des massacres ou des flots massifs de réfugiés, relèvent de la maskirovka. Face à une telle stratégie les diplomates occidentaux qui cherchent anxieusement les signes de désescalade de la Russie sont particulièrement vulnérables. Les troupes massées à la frontière avec l'Ukraine ont été retirées. Voilà, n'est-ce pas, un signe de "désescalade". Elle y reviennent maintenant. Il y aurait donc une nouvelle "escalade". Ces mots ont-il encore un sens pour déterminer l'attitude qu'il convient d'adopter envers la Russie ? A quoi bon chercher à percer les intentions du Président Poutine ? Le moment n'est-il pas venu de modifier les critères d'appréciation de la situation ?  La Russie se conforme-t-elle à ses obligations envers l'Ukraine et envers la Communauté internationale ? Elle occupe la Crimée. Elle n'exerce pas son influence sur les groupes armés pour faire cesser leurs activités. Elle ne contrôle pas sa frontière et n'empêche pas le trafic de ses armes. Quel besoin a-t-on de ces notions incertaines d'escalade ou de désescalade pour déterminer les réactions collectives à la violation du droit international ? On espère donc que les Etats européens franchiront le pas qui est attendu d'eux dans quelques jours et passeront au troisième niveau des sanctions.

 

Note.

La stratégie de la Masksinovska (dissimulation) présente l’avantage pour le Président Poutine de ménager en permanence une porte de sortie diplomatique, mais elle affecte la crédibilité de la Russie et n’est finalement pas compatible avec son statut de grande puissance. On constate surtout qu’elle ne parvient pas à se donner des marges d’initiative lui permettant d’affirmer un leadership dans la crise ukrainienne.

L’Union européenne et les Etats-Unis augmentent l’efficacité de leur pression par la menace de mesures concrètes et pratiquement une forme de mise en demeure adressée à la Russie. En effet, dans le cadre de la doctrine de West Point (post-war) il est essentiel de retrouver des capacités de dissuasion et de pression sans lesquelles la diplomatie n’a aucune prise sur la réalité.

On voit que l’Union européenne attend de la Russie des comportements précis qui répondent aux obligations internationales qui pèsent sur cette dernière, l’exercice de sa capacité d’influence sur les groupes armés et le contrôle de sa frontière, plutôt que des signes apparents de bonne volonté (désescalade).

L’Union européenne est la force et la faiblesse de la doctrine du Président Obama. Les sanctions en effet sont adoptées à l’unanimité des 28 membres et il y a un groupe d’Etats européens qui continue à marquer sa réticence à l’égard des sanctions contre la Russie. On parviendra toujours à une unité de vue entre la France, le Royaume-Uni et l’Allemagne, notamment, sur une politique de sanctions, mais d’autres Etats ne sont pas suffisamment impliqués dans la gouvernance mondiale pour comprendre les enjeux de l’action collective. Cette dimension didactique et pédagogique justifie finalement la participation de tous les membres de l’Union européenne. Si le recours à la force armée, y compris la légitime défense, est généralement un faux remède, il devient essentiel d’élaborer un nouveau schéma de sanctions collectives qui ne dépende pas de l’article 41 de la Charte et de l’exercice du droit de véto au Conseil de sécurité. Les Etats ont le droit et le devoir collectif de sanctionner les violations graves des obligations essentielles envers la communauté internationale. Face au comportement de prédation adopté par la Russie, on attend de chaque Etat qu’il prenne concrètement sa part de la responsabilité collective. De manière générale, la coordination des sanctions que l’on observe dans la crise ukrainienne entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union européenne est une avancée essentielle de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis :

“As we leave an era of American foreign policy dominated by war, we are in a much stronger position to shape a more just and secure peace.  In doing so, we will be vigilant against threats to our security, but we also recognize that we are stronger still when we mobilize the world on behalf of our common security and common humanity.  That is the proud tradition of American foreign policy, and that is what’s required to shape a new chapter of American leadership”

Susan E. Rice, Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice Keynote Address at the Center for a New American Security Annual Conference

DOCUMENTS

I. La synthèse de la situation actuelle du point de vue du Département d'Etat 

06/20/14  Background Briefing on Ukraine; Via Teleconference; Washington, DC

 

MODERATOR: Thanks very much. So thanks to everybody for joining us, and we have with us today a senior Administration official, and we’re here to talk about Ukraine. We don’t have too much time, so I’ll get right into it and turn over the floor.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, colleagues, for joining. I think for purposes of attribution, let’s go with senior U.S. Administration official if that’s okay with everybody.

So just to share with all of you the story of the Ukraine-Russia diplomacy. Since the President’s trip to Europe, just to give you a reminder of where we were when the President was on the road, he, as you recall, had his first meeting with Ukraine’s new president, Poroshenko, in Warsaw even in advance of the – his – of Poroshenko’s inaugural, at which point Poroshenko sketched for the President his intention to pursue a peace plan, which included political outreach to the east, broad decentralization of power, amnesty for separatists, an exfiltration corridor for fighters to go home, and the opportunity for early elections.

Then on the evening of Wednesday the 4th in Brussels, the President met with G7 counterparts. They talked intensively about how to support Ukraine’s aspirations for a stable, peaceful, democratic future and how to encourage Russia to take a de-escalatory path. They issued a communique after the G7 dinner, which included the following calls on the Russian Federation: first, to recognize the results of the election; then to complete the withdrawal of its military forces on the border with Ukraine; third, to stop the flow of weapons and militants across the border; and to exercise its influence among separatists to lay down their weapons and renounce violence.

They also called on the Russian Federation to meet to meet the commitments made in the April 17th Geneva Joint Statement of the EU, Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S., which contained many of the same elements. And they made clear that if Russia did not follow through on all these lines, that there would be additional costs in the form of diplomatic isolation and sanctions.

On Friday, in Normandy, you’ll recall that Chancellor Merkel of Germany, President Hollande of France, President Putin, and President then-elect Poroshenko all sat down together which gave Poroshenko an opportunity to brief Putin directly on his peace plan, to ask for Putin’s support for it and for Russia’s cooperation in helping to close the border. They agreed there that Russia would send a negotiator to Kyiv. Russia – they agreed there that Poroshenko would lay out the elements of his peace plan publicly in his inaugural address the next day, and that Russia would send a negotiator back to Kyiv. And they did that. They returned their ambassador, Ambassador Zurabov to Kyiv, and that Poroshenko would host trilateral negotiations among Russia, Ukraine, and then facilitated by the OSCE to work out the details of the peace plan and the ceasefire and seek Russia’s cooperation.

Poroshenko did then sketch out the peace plan in his inaugural address the following day on Saturday the 5th, and on – no, I’m sorry, Saturday the 7th, and on Sunday the 8th, the trilateral negotiations happened. There have been eight rounds of negotiations among Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE working on a document fleshing out Poroshenko’s peace plan, including many of the details of how it would be implemented. The Russians have participated in these, and the Russian negotiator has regularly been up to Moscow to talk to President Putin. Poroshenko and Putin have now had two, I think three phone calls in total. But the Russians have not, according to the Ukrainians, made any private statements, nor have they publicly endorsed the peace plan.

During this time, as you have seen, the Ukrainians have also been working with their own forces to try to close and interdict illegal crossings along that very long and open border on their eastern edge, Donetsk and Luhansk. They have had some success, but the fighting has been quite fierce. And as we made clear publicly last week, throughout this period, Russia has continued to supply concrete support to the separatists, including across the border.

Just a few details here. We are confident that Russia last week sent tanks and rocket launchers from a deployment site in southwest Russia to eastern Ukraine. We have information that additional tanks have been prepared for departure from the same deployment site. We also have information that Russia has accumulated artillery at a deployment site in southwest Russia, including a type of artillery utilized by Ukrainian forces, but no longer in Russia’s active forces. And we believe that Russia may soon provide this equipment to separatists.

Ground photographs from the destroyed BM-21 multiple rocket launcher that caught fire in Luhansk Oblast last week indicate that the launcher originally belonged to the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Brigade based in Khankala, Chechnya. Russian special forces are also maintaining points along the Ukrainian border to provide support to separatist fighters. Separately we have information that Russia has redeployed significant military forces to its border with Ukraine. Some of these forces are within a handful of kilometers of Ukrainian territory, the closest that they’ve been since the invasion of Crimea. We also have information that additional forces are due to arrive in coming weeks.

And then finally you will have seen many social media reports about new shipments of tanks and heavy artillery across the border just in the last 24 hours. What I can say is that the Ukrainian Government briefed EU and G7 diplomats in Kyiv today that they have evidence of some additional 10 tanks, fuel trucks, and additional supporting vehicles coming over the border outside of Luhansk in the last 24 hours. What I am able to confirm from a U.S. Government perspective is that we have information that additional tanks departed from a deployment site in southwest Russia yesterday.

Against this backdrop, President Poroshenko nonetheless intends to implement his peace plan over the coming days. Yesterday he held a meeting in Kyiv to which he invited all eastern leaders, including the separatists, and to have a broad dialogue about political reconciliation, decentralization, return of budgeting power, local control of language, school, culture, all of those things that are in his peace plan. And we understand that he – as of this morning, he intended to declare the ceasefire within coming hours or days. What we’re not sure about is whether that time table will change as a result of the materiel movements that the Ukrainians have seen in the last 24 hours.

Meantime, we are working intensively with our European allies and partners, particularly in the context of President Poroshenko’s intention to unilaterally move forward with the peace plan and in light of lots of meetings in Europe next week, including the Monday meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, the Tuesday and Wednesday meeting in Brussels of NATO foreign ministers, and the Friday meeting of EU heads of state and government on a three-point plan.

First, for all of us to actively support President Poroshenko’s peace initiative. Second, for all of us to use our influence with the Russian Federation to urge it to take this moment to step back from this destabilizing behavior, to meet the criteria that the G7 puts forward, to end its support for separatism, help close the border, and support all of these things that it has been asking for politically in eastern Ukraine that President Poroshenko is offering in the form of decentralization of power, protection of Russian language, et cetera.

And then third, however, to make clear to Russia that if its destabilization of Ukraine does not abate, and if it does not support this peace plan, that there will be more costs – more costs in the form of isolation and sanctions, and that that will be a unified effort by the U.S. and Europe.

Last point, just to say that Treasury just made public new U.S. sanctions on one, two, three, four, five, six, seven – seven separatist leaders. These are Ukrainians who have been active in the separatist movement in eastern Ukraine. That was just released a minute ago. You can find it on the Treasury website. Let me pause there for questions.

MODERATOR: Okay. Operator, if you could remind folks about the procedure for getting in the queue.

OPERATOR: Certainly, and ladies and gentlemen, once again, if you would like to ask a question on the call, please press * then 1.

MODERATOR: All right. And Operator, we’re ready for the first question, please.

OPERATOR: Great. And we’ll go to Michael Gordon with The New York Times. Please go ahead.

QUESTION: Yes, thank you. A couple of quick questions on your statement just for clarification. You noted that the Ukrainians had observed that these tanks, which you’ve observed on the Russian side of the border, you say the Ukrainians are reporting they’ve crossed – new tanks have crossed into their territory. Do you believe these Ukrainian reports are credible?

Also, what role do you think the Russian troops are playing near the border? Are they facilitating the delivery of these arms, or are they there to dissuade the Ukrainian forces from trying to seal the border?

And lastly, do you believe Russian arms shipments include anti-air weapons of some type since a number of aircraft have been shot down in recent weeks? Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Michael, we are watching the media. We are watching the reports of the Ukrainians ourselves. We are endeavoring to establish the facts through our own means. The only thing I’m in a position to confirm from U.S. independent information today is the statement that I made that we have information that additional tanks departed from a deployment site in southwest Russia yesterday.

With regard to this equipment, as I said in the statement, one of the concerning things about the equipment that we have confirmed has moved from Russia into Ukraine is that much of this is equipment that Ukrainians have in active service, but that Russia no longer uses, leaving the impression that the desire here is to mask the Russian hand and to allow the separatists to assert inaccurately, according to the Ukrainians, that this is materiel that they’ve captured on the battlefield from the Ukrainians when in fact it was not on that battlefield to begin with.

With regard to the Russian reasons for their plus-up up on the border, President Putin did make a public statement about supporting border control about a week ago, but we have not seen this force deploy in positions consistent with border patrol. Rather, as I said, we have seen disturbing evidence that these forces are supporting the acquisition of materiel that the Russians themselves do not use – some of this materiel we’ve seen go over the border – and that the Russian special forces are maintaining points along the Ukrainian border to provide active support for separatist fighters. Social media, the Ukrainians have asserted that there are active training camps there. I have what I gave you in terms of the points that special forces appear to be maintaining to support the separatists.

With regard to surface-to-air, the Ukrainians have recovered MANPAD tubes, particularly at the site of the IL-76 shoot-down from last week. I would refer you to some of the pictures that they’ve put out on their site with regard to the packing crates, shipping lists indicating previous addresses in Russia and in Chechnya.

MODERATOR: All right, thank you. Operator, we’re ready for the next question please.

OPERATOR: And we’ll go to Arshad Mohammed with Reuters. Please go ahead.

QUESTION: Good morning. Two things. One, can you provide any additional information on the individuals whose designations were announced this morning by the Treasury? All I have seen is the most bare-bones data on their names and dates of birth. I know you said that they were involved in the separatist movement in Ukraine, but can you shed some light on whether these are actual fighters, whether they are commanders, whether they are organizers or political figures?

And then secondly, the United States has repeatedly brandished the threat of sectoral sanctions against Russia, but it seems as if the steam has entirely gone out of that since the elections in Ukraine. Is there active, serious consideration of possible imminent sectoral sanctions on Russia, particularly given the tanks crossing, or are your European allies reluctant to take that step, as they have been for some time now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks, Arshad. I am looking at a draft Treasury press release which goes through the names, so perhaps it just hasn’t gotten into your inbox. But just to give you the flavor, one, Ponomaryov – Vyacheslav Ponomaryov is the self-proclaimed mayor of Slavyansk, who takes a takes-no-prisoners approach. Number two, Denis Pushilin is the leader of the group that calls itself the Donetsk People’s Republic. These are the types of guys – Igor Girkin, better known as Igor Strelkov, the self-described commander-in-chief of the Donetsk People’s Republic. Valery Bolotov, the governor of the separatist-controlled Luhansk region. You get the idea.

QUESTION: Thanks. And sanctions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With regard to sanctions, we have been in active conversation with our EU partners on what we call scalpel sanctions, which would be targeted primarily in the financial, defense and high-technology sectors. The idea here is to deny Russia the kind of investment and next-generation technology that it needs to continue to grow. This conversation has been ongoing for some time, but it has intensified over the last week as we have seen Russian materiel move into Ukraine in contravention of our hope and expectations that Russia would take this diplomatic moment to de-escalate. Those conversations are continuing today and over the weekend, and next week Secretary Kerry will be making some calls. We’ve been making some calls at the political director level and the White House is also making some calls, which I’m sure you will hear about in coming days.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MODERATOR: Okay, thanks. Operator, next question please.

OPERATOR: We will go to Luke Johnson with Radio Free Europe. Please go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi. I wondered if you had any assessment of the confidence you have for a ceasefire given after Poroshenko announced that heavy fighting broke out? And secondly, I saw Putin’s foreign policy advisor, Yuri Ushakov, saying that he’s planning to have a phone conversation with Obama in the coming days, and I wondered if you had any comment on that. Thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the latter, I’ll refer you to the White House. They speak about those kinds of things. With regard to the ceasefire, it was very clear that the Ukrainians felt that they had to gain more control of the border between the period of Poroshenko’s inauguration and today before they could move to a ceasefire, particularly given the materiel and fighters that we’ve seen cross over. They have been spending most of their time and effort doing that. Our understanding is that they will continue to do what is necessary to protect the border even as they declared the ceasefire. But the ceasefire is essentially a stand-down of their antiterrorist operation in and around the most dangerous cities – Kramatorsk, Slavyansk, Donetsk, Luhansk – to give the separatists an opportunity to meet them halfway and to demonstrate to the Ukrainian population that this government wants to – that this government is serious about reaching out.

So we will see how the separatists behave. Our view is that this has obviously a much higher chance of being successful if the separatists know that Russia has broken its support for them. And that could come in many forms. It could come in the form of a public statement of support from President Putin for the ceasefire when it happens or for the peace plan. It could come in the form of Russian negotiators traveling to eastern Ukraine and talking to separatists and telling them that there would no longer be any support and that they should accept amnesty and that they should begin cooperating. But we have yet to see any of those moves, but there is still an opportunity, as the President has been saying all along, for President Putin and Russia to de-escalate if they so choose.

So we will see. It is our understanding from our own contacts and from what we’re hearing from the Ukrainian Government, and some of us have been in recent contact with local leaders, governors, Party of Regions, that the population is completely disaffected from the separatists; that the economic conditions are deteriorating rapidly, particularly in some of these occupied towns; and that they want peace, they want an end to this, that they want to get in the business of restoring normal life, and they do want the decentralization and opportunities at local self-governance that the government is now offering, but mostly they want to get back to jobs and growth as all people do, and peace.

MODERATOR: Okay. Thanks, Operator. Next question, please.

OPERATOR: We’ll go to William Mauldin with Wall Street Journal. Please go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks so much for holding the call. Part of my question (inaudible) answered, but I was just wondering if you could comment a little bit further on cooperation with the EU on possible future sector sanctions with Russia. Thanks so much.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, we have had a number of rounds of discussion at the senior expert level, both with the commission and with nation states of the EU, to try to explain the sector – the scalpel sanctions package that we are working on on the U.S. side and to look at what the EU might be able to do at 28 that matches or is as close to equivalent as our different systems allow. We have had quite a bit of convergence in the last week or so and, as I said, senior-level conversations continue and will continue in coming days.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MODERATOR: All right, Operator. Next question, please.

OPERATOR: We will go to Lara Jakes with the Associated Press. Please go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks, Senior Administration Official. I’m wondering if you can give us any explanation based on the intelligence that you’ve seen or maybe on some diplomatic conversations that have been ongoing on why we’re now seeing this resurgence from Russia, why they are now returning to the border even as these peace talks are going on. What is he thinking?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, we have long ago stopped trying to speak for Putin’s intentions or what’s inside his head. Our goal here has been to conduct a two-track approach.

First, as the President’s been saying, to give Putin, to give Russia a chance to de-escalate, a diplomatic path out of this, to try to meet – work with the Ukrainians to meet the legitimate needs of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine for more local self-governance, et cetera; at the same time that we make it clear to Putin and Russia that if they continue destabilizing Ukraine that there will be costs, there will be isolation, there will be more sanctions. We’ve done the round of sanctions that you have seen; our view is that they have had a profound effect on the Russian economy and on how Putin is received around the world.

So Russia has a choice to make again. I will say that some analysts in Ukraine, some analysts in our country believe that the strategy here is to create an Abkhaz-type enclave or a Transnistria-type enclave inside Ukraine on the east. Some believe that the ultimate intentions are full control – political, economic, and in security terms – of the Ukrainian state. I frankly am not going to get inside the heads of folks planning this.

MODERATOR: All right. Thank you, Operator. We have time for one final question. Go ahead.

OPERATOR: And that’ll be from Rosiland Jordan with Al Jazeera English. Please go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks for the call. First, I wanted to see if I could get a little more specificity on Lara’s question about the specific impact, if you have any statistics on the economic impact of the sanctions. Regarding isolation, the U.S. and the other members of the G8 suspended Russia and now it’s back to the G7. What other types of diplomatic isolation could be on the table if this kind of behavior continues? And then finally, regarding Poroshenko’s plan, how much domestic support does the U.S. believe there is for his efforts? Do ethnic Ukrainians support it? Do ethnic Russians trust him? What’s the U.S.’s assessment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the diplomatic isolation, the U.S. and most EU countries have now virtually ended economic – bilateral economic ties with Russia. Obviously, trade ties continue, but in terms of trying to advance a free trade agenda or any of those things, we’ve obviously all ended our military-to-military cooperation. The NATO-Russia Council continues as a political body, but all cooperation within it has ended. The EU in March advised all of its member states to – not to have bilateral visits of senior Russian officials, including President Putin, to their capitals. So this is the kind of thing that could continue, that will continue unless Russia de-escalates.

With regard to the effect of sanctions, we have shared some of these statistics in the past. I don’t have all of them in front of me, but for example, Russia spent more than $60 billion in the last two months trying to support the ruble. Its credit rating is just above junk. The IMF says that it is on the verge of recession with two quarters of negative growth. The inflation is on the rise inside Russia, as is the cost of borrowing, and every time new sanctions are applied, obviously, the market reacts.

With regard to popular support, the first best indicator is how strongly the population across Ukraine in every province of Ukraine supported President Poroshenko, who ran on this peace plan, including among those who were able to vote in Donetsk and Luhansk. I don’t know, Roz, whether there’s been any reliable polling in eastern Ukraine recently on the peace plans. Pretty hard to do at this stage. But one indicator is that polling with regard to Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia has taken a nosedive in the last two months. There was always some ambivalence in western Ukraine, but now across Ukraine attitudes towards Russia – where, I would remind you, almost every family has ties of family – are now at the bargain basement level.

The last point on the sanctions and on the choices that the Russian Government has been making – our concern also continues to be about their impact on average Russians. The Russian state hemorrhages money on their Ukraine – on their Crimea adventure, and now on trying to integrate the Crimean economy into Russia where there’s no geographic bridge even, they’re going to have to spend some five to eight billion building a physical bridge. All the money that they spent keeping troops deployed on Ukraine’s border. Inflation as I said, which is running some 20 percent, which we understand is causing most Russians to delay purchasing now and particularly purchasing of imports and luxury goods. Europeans are reporting to us export goods to Russia – that sales are flat or negative because Russians are just not buying right now.

So at some point the Russian people will start asking what this adventure is worth for them. Where are their hospitals? Where are their schools? Where are their roads, as all this money is flying out of the coffers of the Russian Federation?

QUESTION: Okay, great. Thank you.

MODERATOR: All right. Well, thank you, Senior Administration Official, and thank you to all who participated in the call. We have to cut it off now because we’ve got plenty of other things happening today. So thanks for everyone’s participation, and this closes the call now. Thanks.

 

Ukraine - Communiqué des chefs d'État et de gouvernement du G7 (Bruxelles, 05/06/2014)

Nous nous félicitons de l'organisation réussie, dans un contexte difficile, des élections en Ukraine le 25 mai : le fort taux de participation a souligné la détermination des citoyens ukrainiens à décider de l'avenir de leur pays. Nous nous réjouissons d'accueillir Petro Porochenko en tant que président élu de l'Ukraine et nous le félicitons d'avoir tendu la main à tous les habitants de l'Ukraine.

Face à l'ingérence inacceptable de la Fédération de Russie dans les affaires souveraines de l'Ukraine, nous soutenons le gouvernement et le peuple ukrainiens. Nous demandons aux groupes armés illégaux de déposer les armes. Nous encourageons les autorités ukrainiennes à garder une attitude mesurée dans les opérations qu'elles mènent pour rétablir l'ordre public. Nous soutenons sans réserve la contribution significative de l'Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE) à la désescalade, grâce à la mission d'observation spéciale et à d'autres instruments de l'OSCE. Nous saluons la volonté manifestée par les autorités ukrainiennes de poursuivre le dialogue national sans exclusive. Nous accueillons avec satisfaction le «Mémorandum pour la paix et la concorde» adopté par la Verkhovna Rada le 20 mai et nous exprimons le souhait qu'il puisse être rapidement mis en oeuvre. Nous encourageons aussi le parlement et le gouvernement ukrainiens à poursuivre les réformes constitutionnelles qui offriront un cadre pour approfondir et consolider la démocratie, en tenant compte des droits et des aspirations de tous les habitants de toutes les régions de l'Ukraine.

Le G7 a pris l'engagement de continuer à travailler avec l'Ukraine pour soutenir son développement économique, sa souveraineté et son intégrité territoriale. Nous encourageons l'Ukraine à honorer son engagement de mener les réformes difficiles qui se révèleront cruciales pour maintenir la stabilité économique et libérer la croissance tirée par le secteur privée. Nous nous félicitons de la décision du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) d'approuver un prêt de 17 milliards de dollars en faveur de l'Ukraine, qui viendra renforcer d'autres aides et prêts bilatéraux et multilatéraux, notamment près de 18 milliards de dollars prévus à ce jour par les partenaires du G7. Nous nous réjouissons du décaissement rapide de l'aide macro-économique en faveur de l'Ukraine. Nous soutenons un mécanisme international de coordination des donateurs permettant de garantir la fourniture effective de l'aide économique et nous nous félicitons de l'intention de l'UE de tenir une réunion de coordination de haut niveau à Bruxelles. Nous saluons les efforts actuellement déployés pour diversifier les sources de gaz de l'Ukraine, notamment grâce à des actions récentes de l'UE visant à mettre en oeuvre des capacités d'inversion des flux de gaz et nous espérons que les pourparlers, menés avec la médiation de la Commission européenne, concernant le transit de gaz et l'approvisionnement en gaz de l'Ukraine par la Fédération de Russie connaîtront une issue positive.

Nous condamnons unanimement les violations persistantes de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Ukraine par la Fédération de Russie. L'annexion illégale de la Crimée par la Russie et ses actions visant à déstabiliser l'Ukraine orientale sont inacceptables et doivent cesser. Ces actions violent les principes fondamentaux du droit international et devraient constituer une préoccupation pour toutes les nations. Nous exhortons la Fédération de Russie à reconnaître les résultats de l'élection, à achever le retrait de ses forces militaires de la frontière ukrainienne, à faire cesser les flux transfrontaliers d'armes et de militants et à exercer son influence sur les séparatistes armés pour qu'ils déposent les armes et renoncent à la violence. Nous demandons à la Fédération de Russie d'honorer les engagements qu'elle avait pris dans la déclaration commune de Genève et de coopérer avec le gouvernement ukrainien dans la mise en oeuvre de ses plans pour promouvoir la paix, l'unité et les réformes.

Nous confirmons la décision des pays du G7 d'imposer des sanctions contre les personnes et les entités qui ont soutenu activement ou commis des violations de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Ukraine et qui font peser une menace sur la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité de l'Ukraine. Nous appliquons une stricte politique de non-reconnaissance concernant la Crimée et la ville de Sébastopol conformément à la résolution 68/262 de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies. Nous sommes prêts à intensifier les sanctions ciblées et à mettre en oeuvre d'importantes nouvelles mesures restrictives pour faire payer un coût supplémentaire à la Russie si les événements le requéraient.

Les projets financés par la communauté des donateurs pour rendre le site de Tchernobyl stable et sûr pour l'environnement sont désormais bien avancés. Tout en reconnaissant la complexité liée à ce type de projets qui constitue une première, nous demandons à toutes les parties prenantes de fournir un effort supplémentaire pour les terminer de manière satisfaisante en veillant à maîtriser les coûts. Cela reste pour nous une priorité majeure.

(...)./.

13 Jun. 2014, NATO Secretary General concerned about reports of escalation of the crisis in Eastern Ukraine

I am concerned about reports that pro-Russian armed gangs are acquiring heavy weapons from Russia, including Russian tanks. We have seen reports that Russian tanks and other armoured vehicles may have crossed the border into eastern Ukraine. If these reports are confirmed, this would mark a serious escalation of the crisis in eastern Ukraine.

I continue to urge Russia to complete the withdrawal of its military forces on the border with Ukraine, to stop the flow of weapons and fighters across the border, and to exercise its influence among armed separatists to lay down their weapons and renounce violence.  We call on the Russian Federation to meet its Geneva commitments and cooperate with the government of Ukraine as it implements its plans for promoting peace, unity and reform.

 

II. Le plan de paix du Président de l'Ukraine sur le règlement de la situation dans les régions orientales de l'Ukraine

Contenu :

1. Garanties de sécurité pour tous les participants aux négociations.

2. Amnistie pour ceux qui ont rendu les armes et n'ont pas commis de crimes graves.

3. Libération des otages.

4. Mise en place d’une zone tampon de 10 km le long de la frontière russo-ukrainienne. Retrait des groupes armés illégaux.

5. ouverture d’un corridor sécurisé pour l’évacuation des mercenaires russes et ukrainiens.

6. Désarmement des groupes armés.

7. Mise en place d'unités de patrouilles conjointes dans la structure de la MIA.

8. Libération des locaux administratifs saisis illégalement dans les régions de Donetsk et Luhansk.

9. Restauration du fonctionnement de l'administration locale.

10. Restauration de la télévision centrale et de la radiodiffusion dans les régions de Donetsk et Luhansk.

11. Décentralisation du pouvoir (par l'élection des comités exécutifs, la protection de la langue russe, l’élaboration d’amendements à la Constitution).

12. Coordination des gouverneurs avec les représentants de la Donbass avant les élections (dans le cas de l'approbation de candidature unique, en cas de divergences - la décision est prise par le Président).

13. Organisation des premières élections locales et législatives

14. Programme de création d'emplois dans la région.

15. Restauration des objectifs industriels et des objectifs de l'infrastructure sociale.

In Donbas, Petro Poroshenko presented the peaceful plan on the settlement of the situation in the east of Ukraine

President of Ukraine commanded to cease fire

President of Ukraine had a phone conversation with President of Russia

On June 19, the President of Ukraine had a phone conversation with the President of Russia.

The President of Ukraine outlined key positions and the schedule of implementing the peaceful plan in the east of the state. Petro Poroshenko emphasized the necessity of liberating hostages and establishing an efficient control on the Ukrainian-Russian border.

The Head of State emphasized that along with cease-fire, he counts on the support to the peaceful plan.

The President of Russia expressed support to the efforts on de-escalation of the situation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the cease-fire process and the implementation of the peaceful plan of the Ukrainian President.

Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko.

The heads of state discussed current bilateral relations issues. They touched on the topic of a possible ceasefire in areas of southeastern Ukraine engaged in hostilities.

Vladimir Putin expressed concern regarding the tragic death of Russian journalists in Lugansk and highlighted the need for an absolute assurance of security for members of the media working in Ukraine’s conflict zones.

Petro Poroshenko expressed his condolences regarding the death of Russian media representatives and assured the President of Russia that corresponding investigations will be carried out on his instructions and necessary measures will be taken to ensure safety for journalists.

President of Russia  : On statement by Petro Poroshenko, June 20, 2014, 21:55

The statement by President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko on a temporary ceasefire has been made, incidentally or deliberately, at a time when the Russian territory near the Dolzhansky checkpoint came under fire, and as a result, the building was destroyed and, what's most important, our customs officer has been wounded.

In this connection, the Russian side expects explanations and apologies.

In a situation like this, the Russian side should carefully analyse the text of the Ukrainian President’s respective decision and its implementation procedure.

Unfortunately, the initial analysis shows that this is not a proposal for peace or negotiations, but rather an ultimatum to insurgents in southeast Ukraine to lay down their arms.

So far, the key component is missing – that is the proposal to commence negotiations.

Saturday, June 21, 2014, On the plan for peaceful settlement in Ukraine

Vladimir Putin supports the decision by President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko on ceasefire in east Ukraine as well as his intent to take a number of specific measures to reach a peaceful settlement.

At the same time, the President of Russia notes that the proposed plan will not be viable or realistic if no practical steps are taken to commence negotiation process.

Mr Putin considers it unacceptable when after a ceasefire has been ordered, the confrontation continues and shells from the Ukrainian side land and explode on the Russian territory, causing material damage and threatening life and health of Russian citizens.

The peace plan proposed by President Poroshenko should not take the form of an ultimatum to militia groups. The opportunity that opens up with the end of hostilities should be used to start constructive negotiations and to reach a political compromise between the parties to the conflict in southeast Ukraine.

The President of Russia calls on all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities and sit down at the negotiating table.

Entretien téléphonique entre le Président de la République, la Chancelière allemande et le Président russe

Le Président de la République et la Chancelière MERKEL se sont entretenus conjointement, en fin d’après-midi, avec le Président POUTINE de la situation en Ukraine.

Ils ont de nouveau marqué auprès du Président russe l’importance de parvenir rapidement à un arrêt des combats dans l’Est de l’Ukraine, afin de stabiliser la situation sécuritaire et de créer les conditions d’une désescalade réelle.

Le Président POROCHENKO a indiqué publiquement son intention d’annoncer un cessez-le-feu unilatéral dans l’Est du pays. François HOLLANDE et Angela MERKEL ont demandé au Président russe de faire tous les efforts nécessaires pour convaincre les groupes armés et parvenir le plus vite possible à un arrêt des hostilités.

A défaut, de nouvelles mesures risquent d’être adoptées par la communauté internationale qui affecteront les relations avec la Russie.

Le Président de la République et la Chancelière MERKEL ont appelé, par ailleurs, le Président POUTINE à reprendre les négociations sur les modalités de fourniture de gaz russe à l’Ukraine.

President of Russia : Telephone conversation with Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande, June 19, 2014, 21:45

In line with a previous agreement, Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Federal Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and President of France Francois Hollande.

The leaders continued exchanging views on the development of the crisis in Ukraine. In particular, Mr Putin expressed grave concern about Kiev’s continuing military operation in southeast Ukraine. Hope was expressed that the Kiev leadership’s assurances of intention to end the violence and launch a national dialogue will be implemented immediately.

The heads of state and government also discussed possible consequences following Kiev’s disruption of talks on settling debt for Russian gas supplies on Europe’s economy and energy security.

Entretien téléphonique de Laurent Fabius avec son homologue ukrainien (19.06.14)

Laurent Fabius, ministre des Affaires étrangères et du développement international, s’est entretenu avec son nouvel homologue ukrainien, Pavlo Klimkine, dont la nomination a été confirmée hier par le Parlement ukrainien. Il a chaleureusement félicité M. Klimkine à l’occasion de son entrée en fonction, à un moment crucial pour son pays.

Laurent Fabius a insisté sur la nécessité de tout mettre en œuvre pour permettre un cessez-le-feu durable et respecté par tous. Il est nécessaire de poursuivre sur le chemin des réformes intérieures, afin que les aspirations de l’ensemble de la société ukrainienne soient prises en compte. Le processus de dialogue entamé avec la Russie doit également se poursuivre sur l’ensemble des questions en suspens.

Les ministres sont convenus de rester en contact régulier.

Observation. Le plan  du Président de l'Ukraine a été élaboré en consultation étroite avec l'OSCE et avec la Russie. Les séparatistes ne sont pas écartés des discussions et bénéficient de garanties de sécurité pour se rendre à Kiev. Néanmoins le Président de l'Ukraine refuse de considérer les groupes armés séparatistes liés à la Russie comme les interlocuteurs représentatifs de la population de l'Est.

 

III. Escalade et désescalade, le swing français

 

7. Ukraine - Intervention de M. Laurent Fabius, ministre des affaires étrangères et du développement international, au «Forum for New Diplomacy» (Paris, 18/06/2014)

(...)

En Ukraine, nous avons suivi une ligne de conduite qui était « dialogue et fermeté ». Nous avons considéré que l'annexion de la Crimée par un puissant voisin n'était, du point de vue du droit international, quelles que soient les évolutions historiques, pas acceptables. Il fallait donc réagir mais, d'un autre côté, aucune personne raisonnable ne propose d'aller faire la guerre contre la Russie. C'est donc entre ces deux bornes, ne rien faire ou avoir une attitude homicide, que la diplomatie s'est déployée : dialogue et fermeté.

La France a été active. Je crois que cela a été noté, notamment à travers les épisodes de Normandie. Je pense qu'à travers la mise en dialogue du président russe et du président ukrainien, la mise en dialogue du président russe et du président américain, la France a joué son rôle de pont pour la paix. Nous n'avons pas dans ce domaine, pas plus que dans d'autres, d'agenda caché.

Où en est-on de la désescalade ? Quid du cessez-le-feu ? Quelle peut-être la perspective pour l'accord d'association ? Qu'est-ce que cela signifie en matière d'accord sur le gaz ? En tout cas, il nous paraît évident que l'Ukraine doit, à la fois compte tenu de la géographie et de l'Histoire, entretenir des relations aussi bonnes que possibles avec la Russie et avec l'Union européenne. L'Ukraine est en Europe, même si elle n'est pas dans l'Union européenne. Nous ne croyons pas que l'avenir de l'Ukraine puisse se construire contre la Russie ou contre l'Union européenne.

(...)

Q - Un grand merci Monsieur le Ministre, Vous nous avez vraiment donné de nombreuses propositions et stimulations pour les discussions des diplomates et pour nous ce soir. Je commencerai par la violation des frontières avec l'annexion de la Crimée par M. Poutine. Avez-vous été réellement surpris par cette décision et que pensez-vous de l'avenir des relations avec la Russie ?

R - La diplomatie essaie de prévoir différents scénarios. Il y a d'ailleurs une cellule au Quai d'Orsay qui s'occupe d'analyse stratégique, qui essaie de prévoir une pluralité de scénarios. Nous savions bien sûr qu'il y avait des tensions fortes. À partir de là, il peut y avoir des scénarios différents. Lorsque l'annexion de la Crimée s'est produite, nous avons, au nom des principes que je rappelais, dénoncé cette annexion. Nous l'avons d'ailleurs fait avec la plupart de nos partenaires internationaux.

En même temps, comme je l'ai déjà dit, nous n'allons pas déclarer la guerre à la Russie qui justifie tout cela par une série de données historiques. En l'occurrence, c'est d'un principe dont il s'agit. Les frontières peuvent être artificielles dans leur tracé, mais la stabilité internationale est quand même fondée sur les frontières. C'est d'ailleurs ce que j'ai expliqué à nos collègues chinois qui souvent sont sur la même position que les Russes aux Nations unies. Si on admet qu'une région peut être annexée par un pays voisin et l'on s'appelle la Chine, cela présente quelques inconvénients. Ce n'est pas seulement vrai pour la chine, mais pour n'importe quel pays d'Afrique ou la plupart des pays d'Asie.

Si les frontières sont des chiffons de papier, il n'y a plus de stabilité possible. D'ailleurs, c'est ce que nous avons indiqué à nos partenaires russes en leur disant de faire attention, y compris d'ailleurs avec les connexions avec l'affaire du nucléaire et de la dissuasion. Vous vous rappelez peut-être que l'Ukraine possédait des armes nucléaires, elle était même le troisième pays par la puissance de ses armes nucléaires jusqu'en 1994 où un traité a été passé. L'Ukraine a rendu ses armes nucléaires, elle était du même coup garantie dans son intégrité territoriale par trois pays qui étaient les États-Unis d'Amérique, le Royaume-Uni et la Russie. Non seulement l'un de ces pays n'a pas garanti l'intégrité territoriale, mais il a annexé une partie du territoire. C'est extrêmement dangereux parce que si vous faites la liste des pays qui ont pu, à un moment, vouloir accéder à l'arme nucléaire ou même qui l'ont eue et qui l'ont rendue, qui y-a-t-il ? Il y a l'Ukraine, la Libye et l'Irak. On ne peut pas dire que ce qui est arrivé à ces pays lorsqu'ils ont renoncé à l'arme nucléaire soit extrêmement positif pour leur intégrité. Dès lors, en poursuivant le raisonnement, est-ce que certains pays ne vont pas se dire et nous dire : « si je veux garantir mon intégrité territoriale, il faut que j'aie l'arme nucléaire et que je la conserve ».

Nous avons indiqué aux Russes qui sont contre la prolifération nucléaire que ce qu'ils étaient en train de faire était une incitation indirecte mais assez puissante à ce que les pays se dotent de l'arme nucléaire.

L'autre partie de votre question concerne le type de relations. Historiquement, la France a toujours eu des relations très suivies avec les Russes, quels que soient d'ailleurs les régimes et cela remonte à très longtemps. Les relations ont eu des hauts et des bas mais traditionnellement il y a une amitié et une coopération entre les Russes et les Français. Nous ne partageons pas toutes les idées de ce régime, mais nous considérons que l'intérêt de la France et de la stabilité du monde, c'est de continuer à avoir des relations stables, ce qui ne veut pas dire épouser tous les choix du pays et du régime en cause.

Nous considérons donc que dans ces crises, il y a un rôle de facilitateurs de paix à jouer. Nous avons nos amitiés, nos partenariats, nos alliances, elles sont parfaitement connues mais la France - certains à l'extérieur parfois l'oublient - est une nation indépendante, ce qui ne veut pas dire que nous ne sommes pas fidèles à ces amitiés ou à ces alliances. Cette indépendance peut nous conduire parfois à dire leurs faits aux autorités russes et nous conduit aussi, dans d'autres circonstances ou dans les mêmes à dire à d'autres autorités de ne pas oublier la géographie, la stabilité et la paix.

Ainsi, nous pouvons entretenir le dialogue et ce n'est pas totalement un hasard si c'est en France que s'est noué ce dialogue dont nous espérons qu'il se poursuivra entre la Russie et l'Ukraine. On avait recommandé au président Hollande de ne pas inviter M. Poutine, on lui avait même recommandé, une fois qu'il était invité en tant que président d'un pays qui a contribué et qui a donné des millions de morts pour la liberté pendant la guerre, de décommander mais nous avons tenu bon. Il y a une ironie de l'histoire qui est que les mêmes qui nous avaient recommandé de le décommander nous ont applaudi lorsque le contact a eu lieu. Il aurait été difficile de faire se rencontrer M. Porochenko et M. Poutine si ce dernier était resté en Russie et si M. Porochenko n'avait pas été invité en France.

La France a ses alliances, ses partenariats et ses amitiés, mais elle est une puissance indépendante. Elle essaie autant que faire se peut de travailler pour la paix.

(...)./.

 

3. Ukraine - Communiqué de la présidence de la république (Paris, 14/06/2014)

Le président de la République s'est entretenu cet après-midi avec le président Porochenko.

Il lui a fait part, ainsi qu'au peuple ukrainien, de ses condoléances après l'attaque perpétrée ce matin contre un avion de transport militaire ukrainien à Lougansk, qui a fait au moins 49 morts. Les responsables de cet acte criminel devront être identifiés et traduits en justice.

Le président de la République a assuré le président Porochenko de son plein soutien afin de faire aboutir les négociations engagées entre les autorités ukrainiennes et russes depuis la rencontre de Bénouville.

Il a rappelé en particulier l'importance d'un contrôle par les autorités russes de leurs frontières et d'un appel de Moscou aux séparatistes à cesser le combat.

Il a marqué auprès du président Porochenko la nécessité de trouver un accord sur les modalités de livraison du gaz russe./.

 

IV. Nouveau rapport de l'ONU sur les droits de l'Homme en Ukraine

HCDH, rapport du 15 juin 2014

Réaction de la Russie :

Comment by the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Alexander Lukashevich, regarding the publication of another report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation in the area of human rights in Ukraine

We studied another report on the situation in Ukraine published by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation in Ukraine (OHCHR), which is based on conclusions of the UN Observation Mission for Human Rights in Ukraine.
The unilateral and politically motivated interpretation of events in this country, which took place in May and the beginning of June this year, is evident again. Unfortunately, the elective approach by the authors of this document to the situation in Ukraine has not changed: from the entire scope of available information only that information, which fits earlier formulated conclusionsis reflected.
The attempt to shift all the responsibility for the bloodshed in the East of Ukraine to the insurgent forces of Donetsk and Lugansk without providing any proof, is unacceptable. At the same time, there is no objective assessment of the Kiev’s criminal actions, which leads to military action, including using aviation, heavy artillery and armoured vehicles, against civilians. The observers carefully avoided mentioning the large number of civilian deaths as a result of the punitive operation in Donbass. There has been no condemnation of the actions by the National Guard and mercenary battalions Azov, Dnieper and others, which violate norms of international humanitarian law.
We are especially outraged about the hypocritical recommendation of the Ukrainian authorities to organise their counter-terrorism operation “according to international standards”. In fact, this can be interpreted as an indulgence to continue the elimination of civilians and escalate the conflict. It is strange to hear such things from persons, who position themselves as defendersof human rights, especially in light of the recent appeals of the UN Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to stop the violence.
Along with that, there were some events in Ukraine, which the OHCHR could not disregard due to their wide public resonance. This is lack of progress with regard to amnesty to the protesters in the East of Ukraine, censorship and the prohibition o on Russian channelsto broadcast, deliberate captures of journalists, kidnapping of people by intelligence agencies, growth of hatred speeches, especially in social media.
The compilers of the report demonstrated a more objective approach in writing about the tragedy in Odessa on the 2 May, unlike in their previous similar document. Along with that we have to admit that the authors still aspire to white wash over the Kiev authorities, their supporters and law enforcement agencies, which are responsible for the deaths of dozens of innocent people. There is no mention of the use of poisonous substances; the statistics on the dead and wounded is underestimated. They did not pay any attention to the fact that ultra-right extremists threaten and persecute supporters of federalisation with the full knowledge of the local authorities.
At the same time, the observers at last had the heart to confirm that militants from the Right Sector participated in the events in Odessa on the 2 May, that they were killing those, who attempted to escape from the burning building.
The circumstances of this tragedy are so outrageous that it is impossible to sweep its traces under the carpet, despite all the Kiev’s attempts to do so. The mission was also forced to admit that the Ukrainian authorities, including the Ministry of the Interior and the Ukrainian Security Forces, did not want to cooperate, and the fact that the majority of those who were arrested because of the events on the 2 May were supporters of federalisation. And only two criminal affairs were initiated against radicals, who were guilty of outrageous deaths of people, and those two suspects were subjected only to the house arrest. The facts of ruthless treatment of detained supporters of federalisation were recognised, who were kept for two days almost without food and were refused medical or legal assistance.
The reality overturns the conclusion reached by the observers that Ukraine allegedly continues to bring to life the Geneva agreements of the 17 April. The large-scale, disproportionate, non-elective use of military force in the east of the country, which is in gross violation of international law, hardly fits into these agreements.
They are attempting to impose a false idea of the situation in Crimea to the international community again. It is evident that the western sponsors of the Observation mission cannot accept the legal expression of will by Crimeans, who made their historical choice in favour of security and welfare as a part of Russia.
We are convinced that the observation mission in Ukraine and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights must use all their efforts to ensure independence and transparency of such an investigation. This concerns the massacre in Maruipol, deaths of civilians as a result of actions of the Ukrainian army in the East of the country. The OHCHR has all the necessary possibilities to do this.

Réaction de l'Allemagne : 18.06.2014Human Rights Commissioner welcomes new UN report on Ukraine

I welcome the publication of the latest report from the United Nations on the human rights situation in Ukraine. It is vital for us to have an overview of the facts from an independent source. Without them, there can be no objective analysis of the situation.

I am worried by the report’s findings that human rights abuses are increasingly affecting the civilian population, and in particular women and children, the longer the armed clashes continue. The manifest rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances in connection with the conflict is particularly disturbing.

I call on all parties to the conflict in Ukraine to protect human rights in full and to take action against human rights abuses.

 

V. Le projet de résolution de la Russie

 

La dernière version (17/06/2014) : Russian draft resolution on Ukraine: Humanitarian corridors

 

The Security Council,

PP1 Recalling the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including equal rights and self-determination of peoples, sovereign equality of all its Members, refraining from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,

PP2 Reaffirming its commitment to sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine,

PP3 Recalling all applicable norms of international human rights law and international humanitarian law,

PP4 Recognizing the need for urgent efforts following recent elections of the President of Ukraine aimed at stabilization of situation in Ukraine by peaceful means, as well as the primary responsibility of the Ukrainian authorities to ensure safety and security of the people of Ukraine and their rights and freedoms,

PP5 Expressing deep concern about the continuing crisis in Ukraine, the intensification of hostilities leading to civilian casualties, the destruction of residential buildings and civilian infrastructure, including the supply of food and other staple goods, and the health care,

PP6 Condemning the shelling of residential areas and civilian objects as well as humanitarian convoys,

PP7 Further expressing deep concern at the reports of the use of incendiary bombs and other types of prohibited inhumane weapons, including in population centres,

PP8 Condemning all forms of terrorist activities, including politically motivated attacks and killings,

PP9 Expressing grave alarm at the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in South–Eastern Ukraine,

PP10 Recalling the Geneva Statement of 17 April, 2014 and the "Roadmap for Concrete Steps Forward: the OSCE as an inclusive platform and impartial actor for stability in Ukraine" of 12 May, 2014 prepared by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on the basis of the Geneva Statement,

PP11 Highly appreciating the activities by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in implementation of its mandate, including through finding and revealing facts related to threats to the civilian population and creating conditions conducive to stabilization of situation in Ukraine and restoring security for all citizens on the basis of the "Roadmap" referred to above,

OP1 Demands the immediate cessation of all violence, including military operations, intimidation or provocative actions, in particular endangering the lives and security of the civilian population, civilian infrastructure and humanitarian goods;

OP2 Strongly urges to immediately establish a sustained ceasefire to create environment conducive to the Ukrainian-led inclusive dialogue;

OP3 Condemns the abduction of the members of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and illegal detention of journalists in Ukraine and strongly urges the immediate and unconditional release of OSCE monitors as well as ensuring their freedom of movement and access;

OP4 Demands the establishment of temporary relief corridors in order to allow the civilian population who wish to do so to leave safely the areas of violence and ensure the unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in South-Eastern Ukraine, in accordance with the United Nations Guiding Principles of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance;

OP5 Welcomes the efforts of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, including based on his Roadmap, and calls for launching an all-inclusive Ukrainian-led dialogue involving all political forces and regions of the country, including with the view to reaching agreement on the principles of constitutional reform;

OP6 Encourages in this regard the full implementation of all provisions of the OSCE Chairperson-in Office's "Roadmap";

OP7 Requests the United Nations Secretary-General to support all efforts, including by OSCE, aimed at cessation of violence and finding peaceful sustainable and inclusive resolution of the crisis in Ukraine and to report regularly on security and humanitarian situation in Ukraine;

 

OP 8 Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

 

Le projet initial (O2/06/2014) : Russian draft resolution on Ukraine

The Security Council,

  PP1 Expressing grave concern at the growing level of violence and attacks in South-Eastern Ukraine, in particular the dire situation of thousands of civilians trapped in besieged areas, which significantly threaten the security of the civilian population, resulting in increasing numbers of civilian victims,

PP2 Confirming the continuing validity of the Geneva Statement of 17 April, 2014 and the "Roadmap for Concrete Steps Forward: the OSCE as an inclusive platform and impartial actor for stability in Ukraine" of 12 May, 2014, particularly their provisions to refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative actions,

PP3 Recalling all the applicable norms of international human rights and international humanitarian law,

PP4 Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the protection of humanitarian personnel and on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,

OP1 Demands the immediate cessation of hostilities by the parties in South-Eastern Ukraine and urges the parties to commit themselves to a sustainable cease-fire;

OP2 Demands that the parties establish humanitarian corridors in order to allow the civilian population who wish to do so to leave safely the areas of hostilities and ensure the unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in South-Eastern Ukraine;

OP3 Calls on the parties to implement fully the above-mentioned Geneva Statement and the OSCE Roadmap and to comply fully with applicable international humanitarian law;

OP4 Calls upon the parties to take all appropriate steps to facilitate the efforts of the ICRC, humanitarian agencies, and other relevant humanitarian actors to implement their mandates in South-Eastern Ukraine, including by facilitating safe and unhindered humanitarian access to civilians in need of assistance in accordance with the UN guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance;

OP5 Requests the Secretary-General to report regularly on security and humanitarian situation in South-Eastern Ukraine and to provide the first report by 6 June, 2014;

 

OP6 Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

 

 

Comments to the media by H.E. Mr. Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations on the situation in Ukraine

United Nations Security Council statement on the threat to journalists in Eastern Ukraine

Comments to the media by H.E. Mr. Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations on Ukraine and other issues

Comments to the media by H.E. Mr. Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations on Iraq and Russian draft resolution on Ukraine

Comments to the media by H.E. Mr. Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations on situation in Ukraine

 

Observation. La Russie assure la présidence du Conseil de sécurité au mois de juin. La mission dont a été chatgé l'Ambassadeur Vitaly I. Churkin de faire passer un projet de résolution sur l'Ukraine s'avère très compliquée. Le ministre russe des affaires étrangères a entrepris à plusieurs reprises ses homologues sur cette question, visiblement sans succès. Le premier projet était catégoriquement inacceptable parce qu'il ne mentionnait pas le respect de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Ukraine. Le second est irréconciliable avec le plan du Président de l'Ukraine qu'il ne mentionne pas. Bien plus l'idée de couloirs humanitaires semble tellement irréaliste que l'on se demande pourquoi il faudrait apporter un appui à la propagande russe qui n'a peut-être jamais été aussi loin dans la propagation de fausses informations ou dans l'exagération des faits. Malheureusement pour la Russie Internet permet de suivre l'évolution de la situation avec une marge d'erreurs ou d'ignorance limitée et de nombreuses sources.

 

VI. Nouvelles sanctions ciblées adoptées par les Etats-Unis

 

Treasury Sanctions Additional Individuals For Threatening The Territorial Integrity Of Ukraine

6/20/2014, Sanctions Target Seven Separatists in Ukraine

 

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today sanctioned seven separatists in Ukraine responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security

, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, and/orasserting governmental authority over a part or region of Ukraine without the authorization of the Government of Ukraine.These actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13660.

 

“The United States will continue to take action to hold accountable those persons engaged in efforts to destabilize Crimea andeastern Ukraine,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and financial Intelligence David S

Cohen. “These individuals have allcontributed to attempts to illegally undermine the legitimate goverment in Kyiv, notably by falsely proclaiming leadership positions and fomenting violent unrest.” 

 

Le suivi de la situation par l'OSCE

Compte-rendu quotidien : OSCE Newsroom

 

Latest from the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine based on information received until 20 June 2014, 18:00 (Kyiv time)

Kyiv , 21 June 2014

(...)

No fighting was observed in Luhansk. However, the SMM heard alarm sirens in the city twice in the morning of 20 June. An interlocutor informed SMM that a siren was also heard for a short time in the area near the Luhansk Airport.

Around 6 a.m. on 20 June, according to local witnesses and traffic surveillance camera footage seen by the SMM, a military convoy, of unknown origin, consisting of three tanks and ten BTRs, drove through Luhansk city. An interlocutor told the SMM that the convoy came from the direction of the Russian border, passed Luhansk and headed eastwards. Around noon, another SMM interlocutor observed the same convoy in Alchevsk (44 km south-west of Luhansk), heading in the direction of Donetsk.

(...).

 

NATO RELEASES IMAGERY: RAISES QUESTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ROLE IN PROVIDING TANKS TO UKRAINE